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CT 
In  this paper we  quantify the potentiai  revenue  available  to the U.S.  from 
auctioning import quotas, and the  resulting  drop in foreign producer  surplus 
relative  to free trade.  Previous  estimates of auction  revenue  are in the range 
of $3 7-5.15  billion for 1986  or 1987.  Using simulation  results  from computable 
partial  or  general  equilibrium  models, we find that this revenue  gain weuld be at 
the expense  of  a large drop in foreign  producer  surplus. Ignoring  textiles and 
apparel,  the potential  auction revenue  is $1 3-2.15  billion, and the foreign loss 
Is $0.5-O.7 biflion  relative  to  free  trade. One alternative to  auction quotas is 
a system of  tariff-rate  quotas, which are  designed  to keep supplier countries 
welfare  equal  to that in free trade. We calculate  that the tariff-rate  quotas 
could raise $067-i  .55 billion in  revenue  for the U.S. While  this amount is less 
than available  through auction quotas,  it  could still fund a significant  program 
of worker adjustment,  and would mitigate  the foreign  response. 
Robert Feeristra 
Department  of Economics 
University of  California 
Davis,  CA  95616 Auctioning U.S. Import Quotas and Foreign  Response 
1.  Introduction 
The increased use of "voluntary" export restraints (yEAs) on international 
trade,  rather than tariffs, has allowed supplying nations to capture the quota 
rents through  higher  prices for  their exports.  Recent policy proposals in the U.S. 
have called for the auction of U.S. import  quotas, or their conversion to tariffs, 
allowing the U.S. government to obtain the auction or tariff revenues.1  Bergsten 
et al (1987) estimate potential auction revenues from U.S. quotas on textiles 
and apparel,  steel,  machine tools, sugar and dairy as $5.15 billion, while lower 
estimates of $3.7-4.7 billion are provided by the Congressional  Budget Office 
(1987) for 1987-89.  At a time of high budget deficits in the U.S., this potential 
source of revenue  has attracted Congressional  and media attention.2  The 
auction or conversion of U.S. import quotas is usually thought of as part  of a 
broader plan, whereby the revenue obtained could be used to encourage 
relocation of workers  out of protected industries, with the goal of reducing and 
eventually  eliminating the protection  (Hufbauer and Rosen, 1986; Lawrence 
and Litan, 1986).3 
Advocates of  the auction quotas recognize that there could be some 
foreign  response.  For  example, the Congressional  Budget Office (1987, p. 2) 
states: 
The revenue estimates assume that foreign governments do not 
alter  their behavior in response to the change in the system  of 
allocating  quota rights.  Foreign governments often are willing to 
enter  into VERs with the United States because VERs allow them 
to allocate the higher profits on imports created by the quota  to 
their own producers.  Taxing these rents--by auctioning the quota 
rights--causes  foreign suppliers to lose their profits.  ...Unilateral 
import quotas [by the U.S.)  could induce foreign retaliation in the 
form of restrictions to U.S. exports in other sectors, which would 
lower U.S. government revenues obtainable in those sectors. 2 
Bergsten et al (1987, p. 145) argue that: 
the unilateral imposition of auction quotas could provoke GATT 
disputes and foster demands that the United States compensate 
the affected exporting countries or face the threat of retaliation 
against U.S. exports.  In the most important cases, steel and 
textiles  and apparel, bilateral agreements would be violated.  If 
those agreements were subsequently abrogated by either party, 
new U.S. legislation would be necessary to impose the auction 
import quotas.  Unless such action was coupled with firm 
commitments  by the United States to liberalize its long standing 
quotas,  the unilateral imposition of  auction quotas in these cases 
could seriously compromise the ability of the United States to 
conclude  new multilateral trade agreements. 
Despite these concerns, neither of  the above studies consider any methods to 
mitigate the reaction of trading  partners, beyond a U.S. commitment to liberalize 
trade. Lawrence  and Litan (1986, chapter 5) appear to be alone in proposing 
actual compensation to exporting  countries, using one-half of auction  revenues 
in the first  three years and one-third of  tariff revenues subsequently as 
compensation. 
Whether or not the U.S. should be concerned about the position of its 
trading partners under  a  system of  auction quotas is  open to debate.  The 
international  order established after World War II, including the General 
Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). generally precluded the use of policies 
which would harm trading  partners except under  specific  circumstances.  While 
some believe  that this international order  is now breaking down (see  the 
contributions to Fneden and Lake, 1987), it is still prudent for  the U.S. to 
consider  the foreign  response to auctions quota  For goods which are imported 
from Europe, the European response could involve  retaliation.4  For other 
countries, actions  taken by  the U.S. can affect their willingness to bargain in the 
current Uruguay Round of  GAIT negotiations. With  this perspective  in mind, our 
paper makes two contributions.  First, we shall quantify the loss in foreign 3 
producer surplus due  to auction quotas, relative to a free trade situation. 
Second. we shall consider alternative policies that are designed to raise 
revenue for the U.S. and reduce protection over time, but without  harming 
trading partners. 
In section 2 we present a simple theoretical model of import quotas, 
contrasting the cases where the U.S. is a "small" or "large"  importer.  Estimates 
of the amount of auction revenues are reported in section 3, and the foreign 
producer surplus losses are given in section 4.  These figures are obtained from 
computable  partial or general equilibrium models. We find that possible foreign 
losses due to U.S. quotas are surprisingly high:  in textiles and sugar  the drop in 
foreign producer surplus due to quotas may equal or exceed the quota rents, 
while in several other industries the producer surplus loss is a large fraction of 
the quota rents.  These results indicate that auction quotas can impose a 
substantial loss on U.S. trading partners relative to free trade.  This leads us to 
consider alternative policies in section 5:  allowing above-quota imports at a 
tariff which would diminish over time; or a system of tariff-rate quotas which 
would  implicitly compensate exporters for the trade restriction.  We calculate 
that tariff-quotas could  raise $0.67-i  .55 billion in revenue for  the U.S., while 
keeping  imports at their  current level and foreign welfare equal to that in free 
trade. Conclusions are given in section 6. 
2.  Effects of lmoort Quotas 
The effects of a U.S. import quota are shown in Figure 1.  Consider first 
the case where the U.S. is a "small" country, facing an infinitely elastic world 
excess supply curve at P0 (ignore S  for now).  U.S. import  demand  is D, and 
imports  of this good under  free trade are M0.  An import quota of T  raises the 
U.S. price to P1, and the resulting quota rents are area A.  If the quota is 4 
voluntarily  applied by the exporting countries then they  earn the quota  rents, 
which is a windfall gain over tree trade.  If instead the U.S. auctions the quota, 
or applies a tariff of P1-P0,  then it could obtain A as revenue.  In this case the 
exporters are not signiticantly better or worse oft than with free trade, since it is 
assumed that they can divert the forgone U.S. sates elsewhere with a negligible 
effect on the world price. 
Thus, while exporters lose the quota  rents under  the auction scheme, 
they are not substantially harmed relative to free trade.  In this case it may welt 
be that trading partners could be appeased by a U.S. commitment to lower 
protection in the future, as suggested by Bergsten et al (1987).  However, the 
results are very different when the U.S. is treated as a iarge importer. 
Suppose now that the U.S. faces the world excess supply  S, where P0 
and  Mo still denote the free trade equilibrium.  With a quota ofvoluntanly 
applied  by exporters, the U.S. price rises  to P1 while the supply  price (marginal 
cost) falls to P2.  Supplying countries obtain quota rents of  A+B but suffer a fall 
in producer  surplus of B+C.  On net, the exporters are better off due to the 
voluntary trade restraint if and only if area A exceeds the tilangle  C, which 
need not occur if the quota is sufficiently low.  A switch to auction quotas means 
that the U.S. obtains the revenue A+B, with the trading partners losing surplus 
B+C relative to free  trade.  The outcome is the same as with a tariff of  (P1-P2) 
applied by the U.S., which would be a  beggar thy neighbor policy. 
Empirical studies of  trade policy commonly assume that the U.S. is a 
"small"  importer, facing fixed world prices.  However, this may be simply an 
assumption  of convenience,  since available evidence is thin.  For  example, the 
annotated  bibliography  of price elasticities in intemational trade by Stern et al 
(1976) devotes over 300 pages to demand, but only eight pages to supply.5 
Estimates  of export supply and import demand in a simultaneous  equations 5 
framework  have found upward sloping rather than horizontal supply curves.6 
We shall rely on simulation  results from computable general equilibrium  (CGE) 
and partial equilibrium (PE) models to determine the effect of U.S. trade policies 
on foreign prices and welfare. 
In CGE models, a quota M  can lead to lower marginal costs (moving 
down S) due to changing factor prices in exporting countnes.  In PE models, an 
estimate of  the elasticity of S  is used.  In both cases, the effects of trade policy 
can be calculated  with multiple exporting and importing countries, and market 
clearing  in many goods.  The studies we cite in section 4 show that U.S. trade 
policy can have a significant effect on the  supply price of its imports (i.e. on its 
terms of  trade).  We should note, however, two limitations of the studies.  First, 
many of  the studies rely on the Armington assumption, under which domestic 
and imported varieties of a  good are treated as imperfect substitutes in U.S. 
demand.  Several  authors have argued that this assumption  may exaggerate 
the effects of  trade policy  on the terms of trade, and therefore overstate the 
potential drop in foreign producer surplus due to a quota.7 Second. the studies 
we use assume perfect competition.  Recent literature has argued that the 
effects of trade policy are sensitive to the  market structure (see the contributions 
to Krugman,  1986), while Krishna (1988)  has analysed how potential auction 
revenues  depend  on the type of  competition.  Extending the topic of  this paper 
to imperfect  competition is an important area for further research. 
3  Revenue  from U.S. Auction Quotas 
In Table  1  we show estimates of the revenue available from auctioning 
existing U.S. import quotas.  The estimates are obtained from two sources:  the 
Institute for lntemational  Economics (lIE), reported by Bergsten et al (1987, 
Table 4.1); and the Congressional  Budget Office (1987, Table 1). These studies 6 
report auction  revenue for the steel, textile and apparel, machine tools, sugar 
and dairy industries, for the years 1986 or 1987. The figures in column  1  of 
Table  1  are lower than those reported earlier by the lIE (see Bergsten  et al, 
1987, Table  3.3), because the earlier estimates of potential auction  revenues 
reflected quota  rents going to covered  uncovered foreign  suppliers.8  That 
is, with an import  quota or VER restricting sales from some  countries, the higher 
U.S. price which results can be obtained by all supplying countries.  We believe 
this phenomenon is itself evidence that the U.S. should be treated as a large' 
importer,  since exporters not covered by a quota who obtain higher U.S. prices 
must be moving up their  supply (marginal cost) curves.9 
Remaining differences between the lIE and OBO estimates in Table  1  are 
smali, and can be attributed to differing treatment of exchange rates and 
estimates of  the tariff equivalent to quotas (see Bergsten et al, 1987, pp. 49-50). 
The potential revenue of $3.7-5.15 billion represents the U.S. gain and foreign 
loss from an auction, as compared to the current system whereby exporting 
countries obtain the quota  rents.10  However, we feel  this monetary transfer  is 
not a good indication of the true foreign loss from an auction, since the quota 
rents now earned abroad are a windfall gain to foreign exporters.  In the next 
section we estimate the foreign  loss relative to free trade, and in section 5 
discuss policies to minimize this loss.  (The remainder of Table 1 is discussed in 
section 5). 
4.  Foreign  Producer. Surolus 
In Table 2 we report the loss in foreign producer surplus, relative to free 
trade, from the auction of import quotas by the U.S.  In the first column we show 
the ratio Loss/Rent, which equals (B+C)/(A+B) in Figure 1.  Note that a value of 
flj  for  this ratio means that exporting countries would gain as much from 7 
quota rents due to a VER as they lose in producer surplus, and would therefore 
be indifferent  between the VER and free trade.  However, a quota at the same 
level which was auctioned would lead to a foreign loss relative to tree trade.  In 
column 2 of Table 2 we compute the $Loss by multiplying the Loss/Rent ratio 
with the estimates of auction revenue from Table  1.  This approach assumes 
that auction quotas would only be applied against suppliers which are presently 
covered by quotas.11 We also list in Table 2 the source study for calculating 
Loss/Rent.  Below we provide details on the studies for  each industry, which use 
either a computable general equilibrium  (CGE) or a partial equilibrium  (PE) 
model. 
Steel 
Tan' (1987) constructs a three-region  PE  model with exports  of steel from 
Korea and other supplier  countries to the United States and European 
Economic Community (EEC), calibrated to 1984.  Using the "best estimates" of 
parameters, the U.S. and EEC import quotas transfer  $41.9  million in rents to 
Korea, which obtains a net gain of $32.4 million relative to free trade. 
Auctioning the U.S. and EEC quotas would therefore  lead to a $41 .9-32.4 
$9.5 million drop in Korean welfare compared with free trade, so Loss/Rent = 
9.5/41.9 =  0.2.  We assume that these estimates of the Loss/Rent ratio apply to 
all count,ios  constrained by the U.S. import  quotas (i.e. to  all the potential 
auction revenue in Table  1) when calculating the range of $Loss in Table 2. 
Note  that Tan- also examines whether  there are elasticity parameters which 
would give Korea a net loss from the existing quotas (meaning that Loss/Rent> 
1), but finds that these elasticities are implausible. 8 
Textiles and Acoarel 
Trela and WhaUey (1988)  construct a CGE model covering bilateral 
quotas on exports of textiles and apparel from 34 developing countries to the 
U.S., Canada and the EEC, calibrated to the mid-1980s.  They find that the vast 
majority of supplying countries would gain from the elimination of quotas, 
despite the resulting loss in their quota rents. With their central parameters, 
they find that the elimination of import quotas into  the U.S., Canada and the 
EEC would give a gain of $4.8 billion to all supplying countries.  While the same 
experiment is not performed for  jjj1  the U.S., they report that eliminating quotas 
tariffs in the U.S. raises supplying countries welfare about one-half  as much 
as eliminating quotas  and tariffs in the U.S., Canada and EEC.  We conclude 
that the U.S. import quotas yield a net loss for  supplying countries of abo.t  $2.4 
billion, despite the quota rents they  receive which are $2.9 billion in the study. 
Auctioning the U.S. quotas would therefore lead to a $2.4 + 2.9 = $5.3 billion 
drop in supplier welfare compared with no import quotas, so Loss/Rent = 5.3/2.9 
= 1.8.  The $Loss in Table 2 is calculated using the range of potential auction 
revenues  in Table 2, resulting in a $4.3-$5.4 billion loss for  developing 
countries.  These figures are large due to the restrictiveness of recent quotas: 
previous estimates by Trela  and Whalley using quotas from early 1980 showed 
that only some of the supplying  countries would gain from elimination of quotas. 
Sugar 
Leu, Schmitz and Knutson (1987) construct aPE model of U.S. sugar 
imports, allowing for an upward  sloping world excess supply with elasticity 2.37. 
Calibrating the model to 1983-84, they consider alternative estimates of the 
quota  price premium, reflecting shifting world supply.  With quota premiums of 
7  and 100 per raw pound they report quota rents  of $619 and $885 million, 9 
respectively.12  For the data provided, the drop in foreign producer surplus in 
these two cases is calculated as $681 and $702 million, so that Loss/Rent = 
681/619 = 1.1 and 702/885 = 0.8, respectively.  These figures show that the loss 
in foreign producer surplus roughly equals the quota rents, so that supplying 
countries  are not gaining from existing quotas.  As  the authors note (p. 597): 
interestingly, while countries holding sugar quotas once favored a restrictive 
U.S. sugar policy which generated high quota rents, in lobbying activities 
related to  the 1985 farm bill, they joined with sugar user and consumer groups 
in support of lower sugar price support as a means of maintaining a market for 
sugar in the United States. 
Webb et al (1987) describe the effects of trade liberalization in a PE 
world trade model with 8 regions and 13 agricultural commodities.  A special 
run of this model was performed to  calculate the effects of  eliminating U.S. price 
supports  and import quotas in dairy, for 1986.13 The simulations  show an 
increase in world prices for cheese, butter and milk powder  of 14%, 13% and 
10%, respectively, with a reduction in U.S. domestic prices of 16.8%, 33% and 
5.5%.  Of  these three products, imports of  cheese account  for over  95% of  total 
import quantity.  The simulations indicate a quota premium  (diflerence between 
initial U.S. and world prices) of 14 + 16.8  30.8% for  cheese,  and so the 
change  in world prices relative to the quota premium is 14/30.8 = 0.45.  This is 
an estimate of (Po-P2)/(P1-P2) = B/(A+B) in Figure 1, and is therefore  an 
underestimate of the Loss/Rent = (B+C)/(A+B) ratio. 
Considering  the overall results in Table 2, the Loss/Rent ratios show a 
wide variation across industries.  These ratios depend on the extent to which 
U.S. imports affect world prices, and on the restrictiveness  of existing quotas. 10 
Summing across industries, we obtain a foreign loss of $4.8-6.1 billion relative 
to free trade due to the auction of U.S. import quotas.14  This range exceeds the 
potential auction revenues  available, illustrating that the revenue gain to the 
U.S. is at the expense of foreign producer surplus. The magnitudes are, 
however, dominated by the textile and apparel industry.  Omitting that industry, 
the potential auction  revenue from Table 1  is $1 .3-2.15 billion, and the foreign 
loss is $O.5-0.7 billion relative to free trade.  In this case the gain to the U.S. is 
about three times  higher than the foreign loss, but the auction quotas would  still 
be acting as a beggar thy neighbor' policy.  In the next section we shall 
consider alternative  policies to raise revenue for  the U.S. and reduce 
protection, but without  harming trading partners. 
5.  Alternative  Policies 
One  policy option for  the U.S. would be to allow above-quota imports at 
specified tariff rates.  The tariffs could initially be set approximately  equal to the 
existing quota premium or  higher, resulting in little or no additional imports. 
Over time the tariff could be reduced, together with possible growth  in the quota, 
moving the market  towards  free trade.  This type of  policy has been advocated 
by Cline (1987)  and Sampson and Takacs  (1988) for  world  trade in textiles and 
apparel. 
From the foreign perspective, this policy is much preferable to auction 
quotas.  The possibility of  above-quota imports subject  to a tariff  could be seen 
as betler  than strict quota limits, even though the additional imports would  lower 
U.S. prices and erode quota rents.  From the U.S. perspective the main 
drawback is that revenue obtained would be much lower than with auction 
quotas.  However, as imports grow above the quota then tariff revenue would 
rise, and it could  still be targetted for worker relocation and assistance. 11 
The above policy amounts to the use of tariff-rate quotas, or tariff-quotas, 
which specify a quota and a tariff for above-quota imports.15  Supplying 
countries  earn rents on sales up to the quota, while the U.S. would collect 
revenue on sales under the tariff.  Varying the quota limit allows different 
allocations of  the revenuelrents  across countries.  Feenstra and Lewis (1987) 
propose that the quota should be set  so that the supplying countries receive 
rents exacttv eQual to  their producer surplus loss, leaving them in the 
welfare position as free trade.  In Figure 1, the quota  M  and tariff (P1-P2) would 
be set such that (P1-P2) M = area (B+C). This means that Loss/Rent = 
(B+C)/(A+B) = (Pj-P2) M/(P1-P2)M=  M'/FA, which is the traction of  total trade not 
subject to the  tariff.'6  In addition to the neutral effect of this policy  on foreigners, 
Feenstra and Lewis argue that it has beneficial incentive effects at home:  under 
this policy  the domestic  government has no incentive to overstate or understate 
the political pressure for import protection, since it now must "pay for protection 
with a portion of  the revenue/rents. 
We can illustrate the tariff-quota poflcy for  the industries included in this 
study.  In order for supplying countries to be left in the same welfare  position as 
free trade, they should receive compensation (B+C) in Figure 1.  Expressed as a 
fraction of total revenue/rents, the compensation is (B+C)/(A+B) = Loss/Rent as 
shown in Table 2.  This leaves  [1 - (LosslRent)J available to the U.S. as  tariff 
revenue on above-quota  imports.  To illustrate, in Figure 
1  the tariff revenue is 
(P,-P2)(M-M).  and dividing by total revenue/rents of (P1-P2)Ewe obtain [1- 
(M/)J =  11 - (Loss/Rent)].  These fractions are shown in the third column of 
Table 1, and indicate the portion of  total  revenue/rents which the U.S. could 
retain under  the tariff-quota  plan.  In the case of textiles and apparel we have 
that [1 - (Loss/Rent)] is negative, meaning that the U.S. would  have to transfer 
than the total  revenue/rents to supplying countries to offset their producer 12 
surplus  loss.  Since  such an  action would  not  be  politically feasible, we 
impose  a  lower  bound  of  zero on  [1  - (Loss/Rent)J. 
Multiplying the  third  column in Table  1  by  the  first  or second  gives  the 
estimate of revenue available to  the  U.S.  through  the  tariff-quota plan,  in 
column  four.  Summing aoss  industries  we find  that  $(167-1 .55  billion in 
tariff revenue on above-quota imports could be obtained, while  keeping foreign 
welfare  equal to free  trade  (except  in textiles and  apparel).17  While this 
estimate of  U.S. revenue  under  the  tariff-quota is  much  less than  potential 
auction  revenues, the neutral effect  on  foreigners would  mitigate  their 
response.  En  addition, the  revenue  available  could  still  be  sufficient to  fund 
a  significant  program  of  worker  adjustment and  assistance.  For  example, 
Lawrence and  Utan  (1986,  Table  5-1)  use  outlays of  $0.8-i.6  billion  per  year 
for worker  compensation.  The  U.S.  Trade Bill  of  1988  proposes  a  0.15%  import 
duty to finance  benefits under the  Trade Adjustment Assistance program,  and 
this  duty  is  intended to raise $0.8  billion  in  revenue.18  Our  calculations 
show  that this  amount  or  more  could  be  available by the  conversion of  existing 
U.S.  import quotas  to  tariff-rate  quotas, designed to  keep  foreign welfare 
equal  to  that  in free  trade.  The tariff-rate  quotas  could  also  be  applied  to 
industries in which  new  protection is  called for.  In  either  case  the  policy 
should be viewed  as temporary, with  a  declining tariff over  time  moving the 
market towards  liberalized trade. 
6.  Conclusions 
As the  members of  the  General Agreement on  Tariffs and Trade  (GAll)  enter 
into  the  Uruguay Round  of trade  negotiations,  methods  are  being  sought  to 
restrict the use  of  bilateral agreements such  as  VERs.  Proposals to  auction 
U.S.  import  quotas, or more generally substitute tariffs for quotas,  seem to 
move  in  that  direction by being  more  transparent than  VER5  and  not 13 
discriminating against supplier  countries.  From the  U.S.  perspective, these 
policies  have the  advantage  of  raising substantial revenue.  However, from  the 
foreign  perspective these  actions can  affect the  terms  of  trade  and  lower 
welfare.  Under Artide  XIX  of  GAiT,  tariffs  and  quotas  would  be  subject to 
foreign  retaliation.  As  argued by Bergsten et  al  (1987).  the  auction  of  import 
quotas  could  compromise the  ability of  the  U.S. to conclude  new  multilateral 
trade  agreements. 
In  this paper  we have quantified the  potential auction revenues available 
to  the  U.S.,  and resulting drop  in foreign producer surplus  relative  to free 
trade.  Estimates of  auction  revenue  are in  the  range of  $3.7-5.15 billion  for 
1986  or  1987.  Using simulation  results  from  computable partial  or  general 
equilibrium models, we have found  that this  revenue  gain  would  be  at  the 
expense of  a  larger  drop  in foreign producer surplus.  Ignoring textiles  and 
apparel, the potential auction  revenue  becomes $1.3-2.15 billion, and  the 
foreign  loss is  $O.5-0.7  billion  relative to free  trade.  In  this  case  the  gain 
to  the  U.S. is  about  three times  higher than the foreign loss,  but the cost to 
supplier  countries relative to  free  trade is  still substantial. 
One  attemative  to  auction  quotas  is  a system of tariff-rate quotas,  or 
tariff-quotas, which are  designed to  keep  supplier  countries welfare  equal to 
that  in  tree  trade.  The  tariff-quotas allow  an  allocation of the  revenue/rents 
between the exporters and  importer, avoiding the  extremes of  VERs  (all  rents to 
the exporters)  or  tariffs  (all revenue  to the  importer).  We  calculate that  for 
the  industries now  subject to import quotas, $0.67-i .55  billion  in tariff 
revenue  could  be  raised  by the  U.S.. while  keeping  imports at  their  current 
level  and  foreign welfare  equal  to  that  in free trade  (except in textiles  and 
apparel).  This  revenue  is  much  less than available through  auction  quotas,  but 
could  still  fund  a  significant program of  worker  adjustment and  assistance. 14 
The preference of trading  partners for tariff-quotas over auction quotas would 
make it easier to conclude  multilateral trade agreements, allowing trade 
liberalization to proceed. Footnotes 
1The idea of auctioning import quotas has previously been analyzed for 
some developing countries (see Kafka, 1956, and Bhagwati,  1962), and has 
been used in Australia and New Zealand (Bergsten et af, 1987, chap. 7). 
2Media examples are Newsweek, January 12, 1987, p. 40; The Wail 
Sireet  Journal, February 6, 1987, p. 40; and Business Week, March 9, 1987, p. 
27.  Congressional  discussion of  auction quotas is summarized in Bergsten  et 
al (1987, chap. 1). 
3A theoretical  model in which tariff revenues are used to reduce lobbying 
pressure for import protection is analyzed in Feenstra and Bhagwati (1982). 
4The European Community is usually quick  to respond to U.S. trade 
actions  affecting them, and have threatened to initiate a GATT challenge to a 
U.S. import quota on machine tools (see Bergsten et al, 1987, p. 134).  In 
contrast,  Japan often does not respond to U.S. restrictions given the existing 
trade surplus with the United States. 
5This observation is due to Haynes et al (1986, note 2). 
6For  example, Goldstein and Kahn (1978) and Haynes  and Stone 
(1983).  Since studies of  this type often consider aggregate imports for a 
country, the results cannot be used to analyze trade policy in specific 
commodities. 
7See Deardorff and Stern (1986, p. 61), Melo (1986)  and Brown (1987). 
8Eartier estimates of potential auction revenues also included the 
automobile  industry, but-the recent appreciation of the yen and loosening of the 
export restraint with Japan means the quota rents are now small. 
9Under imperfect competition,  uncovered suppliers could  be raising their 
prices strategically.  Evidence for the automobile industry is presented in 
Dinopoulos and Kreinin (1988), who estimate that the U.S. prices of European 
cars  rose by one-third due to the VER with Japan. 2 
lODairy imports are an exception since the quota rights are now given to 
u.S. importers (Bergsten et al, 1987, P.  40).  An auction quota would therefore 
transfer the rents from U.S. firms to the government. 
liThis assumption is also made by Bergsten et al (1987). 
l2They also use a quota premium of 15 per raw pound when  world 
supply is very high (so the quota is more restrictive relative to free trade), but 
they consider this an extreme case. 
13Actually, the simulation involved the liberalization of all U.S. 
agricultural imports, but we do not expect the feedback from other sectors to 
dairy to be large. 
14Th be precise, the foreign producer losses are relative to a situation of 
no import quotas, but due to existing MFN tariffs, that situation is not free trade. 
15As analyzed by Sampson  and Takacs (1988), below-quota  imports 
could be subject to existing MFN tariffs.  They also consider now  the quota 
licenses could be reallocated over  time to promote efficient supply. 
l8Figure  1  illustrates the case where the foreign compensation  (P1-P2) 
M' = (B+C) is less than the total revenue/rents (A+B), so that M' < T  and a tariff- 
quota can be used to keep foreign welfare equal to free trade.  For very 
restricted trade however, the required foreign compensation  (B÷C) can exceed 
the tariff revenue (A+B), as discussed below for  textiles and apparel. 
17The qualification in footnote 14 still applies. 
18Summary of the Conference Agreement on H.R. 3, The Omnibus 
Trade  and Competitiveness  Act of 1988,  April 19, 1988, Government  Printing 
Office:  Washington, D.C. References 
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Revenue Available from U.S. Auction Quota 










































nJa. =  not available. 
a.  From Bergsten et al (1987, Table 4.1), estimates for 1986 or 1987. 
b.  From Congressional  Budget Office (1987, Table 1), estimates for 1987. 
c.  From column 1, Table 2, and imposing a lower bound of zero. 
d.  Equals columns I or 2 times column 3. 
e.  A range of 0-1 is used in column 3 when calculating  column 4. Table  2 
Foreign  Producer Surplus  Loss 






Method and Source 
Steel 















Trela and Whalley (1988) 
Leu eta! (1987) 
Webb et  al (1987) 
a.  (Loss/Rent) = (B÷C)/(A..-B)  in Figure 1. 
b.  Equals  column  1, Table 2 times columns  1  or 2, Table 1. 
c.  For dairy, the figures shown are the foreign loss due to U.S. auction 
quotas or under the present system, since the quota  rents now go to U.S. 
importers. d
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